Missouri conservationist magazine in pdf to download for free

Its strength raised fundamental issues for the balance of power in Europe, and its aspirations threatened to make impossible a return to the prerevolutionary equilibrium. The liberties of Europe and its concomitant system of order required the participation of an empire far larger than the rest of Europe together and autocratic to a degree without precedent in European history. Since then, Russia has played a unique role in international affairs: part of the balance of power in both Europe and Asia but contributing to the equilibrium of the international order only fitfully.

It has started more wars than any other contemporary major power, but it has also thwarted dominion of Europe by a single power, holding fast against Charles XII of Sweden, Napoleon, and Hitler when key continental elements of the balance had been overrun. Its policy has pursued a special rhythm of its own over the centuries, expanding over a landmass spanning nearly every climate and civilization, interrupted occasionally for a time by the need to adjust its domestic structure to the vastness of the enterprise—only to return again, like a tide crossing a beach.

From Peter the Great to Vladimir Putin, circumstances have changed, but the rhythm has remained extraordinarily consistent. Everything about Russia—its absolutism, its size, its globe-spanning ambitions and insecurities—stood as an implicit challenge to the traditional European concept of international order built on equilibrium and restraint.

With Vikings to its north, the expanding Arab empire to its south, and raiding Turkic tribes to its east, Russia was permanently in the grip of conflating temptations and fears. The most profound disjunction had come with the Mongol invasions of the thirteenth century, which subdued a politically divided Russia and razed Kiev. Two and a half centuries of Mongol suzerainty — and the subsequent struggle to restore a coherent state based around the Duchy of Moscow imposed on Russia an eastward orientation just as Western Europe was charting the new technological and intellectual vistas that would create the modern era.

Europe was coming to embrace its multipolarity as a mechanism tending toward balance, but Russia was learning its sense of geopolitics from the hard school of the steppe, where an array of nomadic hordes contended for resources on an open terrain with few fixed borders. There raids for plunder and the enslavement of foreign civilians were regular occurrences, for some a way of life; independence was coterminous with the territory a people could physically defend.

Russia affirmed its tie to Western culture but—even as it grew exponentially in size—came to see itself as a beleaguered outpost of civilization for which security could be found only through exerting its absolute will over its neighbors.

In the Westphalian concept of order, European statesmen came to identify security with a balance of power and with restraints on its exercise. The Peace of Westphalia saw international order as an intricate balancing mechanism; the Russian view cast it as a perpetual contest of wills, with Russia extending its domain at each phase to the absolute limit of its material resources. Thus the American man of letters Henry Adams recorded the outlook of the Russian ambassador in Washington in by which point Russia had reached Korea : His political philosophy, like that of all Russians, seemed fixed on the single idea that Russia must roll —must, by her irresistible inertia, crush whatever stood in her way … When Russia rolled over a neighboring people, she absorbed their energies in her own movement of custom and race which neither Czar nor peasant could convert, or wished to convert, into any Western equivalent.

With no natural borders save the Arctic and Pacific oceans, Russia was in a position to gratify this impulse for several centuries—marching alternately into Central Asia, then the Caucasus, then the Balkans, then Eastern Europe, Scandinavia, and the Baltic Sea, to the Pacific Ocean and the Chinese and Japanese frontiers and for a time during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries across the Pacific into Alaskan and Californian settlements.

It expanded each year by an amount larger than the entire territory of many European states on average, , square kilometers annually from to When it was strong, Russia conducted itself with the domineering certainty of a superior power and insisted on formal shows of deference to its status. When it was weak, it masked its vulnerability through brooding invocations of vast inner reserves of strength. In either case, it was a special challenge for Western capitals used to dealing with a somewhat more genteel style.

Thus the world-conquering imperialism remained paired with a paradoxical sense of vulnerability—as if marching halfway across the world had generated more potential foes than additional security. In this context, a distinctive Russian concept of political legitimacy took hold. A common Christian faith and a shared elite language French underscored a commonality of perspective with the West. Russia had joined the modern European state system under Czar Peter the Great in a manner unlike any other society.

On both sides, it proved a wary embrace. Peter had been born in into a still essentially medieval Russia. As a young ruler, he toured Western capitals, where he tested modern techniques and professional disciplines personally.

Yet the suddenness of the transformation left Russia with the insecurities of a parvenu. This is clearly demonstrated by the following Observations. Nevertheless, like his successor reformers and revolutionaries, when his reign was over, his subjects and their descendants credited him for having driven them, however mercilessly, to achievements they had shown little evidence of seeking. According to recent polls, Stalin too has acquired some of this recognition in contemporary Russian thinking.

It is expedient so to be that the quick Dispatch of Affairs, sent from distant Parts, might make ample Amends for the Delay occasioned by the great Distance of the Places. Every other Form of Government whatsoever would not only have been prejudicial to Russia, but would even have proved its entire Ruin. Thus what in the West was regarded as arbitrary authoritarianism was presented in Russia as an elemental necessity, the precondition for functioning governance.

The Czar, like the Chinese Emperor, was an absolute ruler endowed by tradition with mystical powers and overseeing a territory of continental expanse. Yet the position of the Czar differed from that of his Chinese counterpart in one important respect.

He favors the good and punishes the bad … [A] soft heart in a monarch is counted as a virtue only when it is tempered with the sense of duty to use sensible severity. Not unlike the United States in its own drive westward, Russia had imbued its conquests with the moral justification that it was spreading order and enlightenment into heathen lands with a lucrative trade in furs and minerals an incidental benefit.

Yet where the American vision inspired boundless optimism, the Russian experience ultimately based itself on stoic endurance. They are Scythians! What resoluteness! The barbarians! By the time the Congress of Vienna took place, Russia was arguably the most powerful country on the Continent.

Its Czar Alexander, representing Russia personally at the Vienna peace conference, was unquestionably its most absolute ruler. A man of deep, if changing, convictions, he had recently renewed his religious faith with a course of intensive Bible readings and spiritual consultations. For on behalf of its new vision of legitimacy, Russia brought a surfeit of power.

Czar Alexander ended the Napoleonic Wars by marching to Paris at the head of his armies, and in celebration of victory he oversaw an unprecedented review of , Russian troops on the plains outside the French capital—a demonstration that could not fail to disquiet even allied nations.

In the space of twenty-five years, they had seen the rationality of the Enlightenment replaced by the passions of the Reign of Terror; the missionary spirit of the French Revolution transformed by the discipline of the conquering Bonapartist empire. French power had waxed and waned. Many called Talleyrand an opportunist. Talleyrand would have argued that his goals were stability within France and peace in Europe and that he had taken whatever opportunities were available to achieve these goals.

He had surely striven for positions to study the various elements of power and legitimacy at close hand without being unduly constrained by any of them. Only a formidable personality could have projected himself into the center of so many great and conflicting events.

The vanquished enemy would become an ally in the preservation of the European order in an alliance originally designed to contain it—a precedent followed at the end of World War II, when Germany was admitted to the Atlantic Alliance.

It produced a consensus that peaceful evolutions within the existing order were preferable to alternatives; that the preservation of the system was more important than any single dispute that might arise within it; that differences should be settled by consultation rather than by war. After World War I ended this vision, it became fashionable to attack the Congress of Vienna order as being excessively based on the balance of power, which by its inherent dynamic of cynical maneuvers drove the world into war.

The British delegation asked the diplomatic historian C. Webster, who had written on the Congress of Vienna, to produce a treatise on how to avoid its mistakes. But that was true, if at all, only in the decade prior to World War I. The statesmen who assembled in Vienna in were in a radically different situation from their predecessors who drafted the Peace of Westphalia.

The application of Westphalian principles was then expected to produce a balance of power to prevent, or at least mitigate, conflict. Over the course of the next nearly century and a half, this system had managed to constrain challengers to the equilibrium through the more or less spontaneous alignment of countervailing coalitions.

The negotiators at the Congress of Vienna faced the wreckage of this order. The balance of power had not been able to arrest the military momentum of the Revolution or of Napoleon. A new balance of power had to be constructed from the wreckage of the state system and of the Holy Roman Empire—whose remnants Napoleon had dissolved in , bringing to a close a thousand years of institutional continuity—and amidst new currents of nationalism unleashed by the occupation of most of the Continent by French armies.

That balance had to be capable of preventing a recurrence of the French expansionism that had produced near hegemony for France in Europe, even as the advent of Russia had brought a similar danger from the east. Hence the Central European balance also had to be reconstructed. These were large and polyglot roughly present-day Austria, Hungary, Croatia, Slovenia, and southern Poland , and now of uncertain political cohesion.

Several of the smaller German states whose opportunism had provided a certain elasticity to the diplomacy of the Westphalian system in the eighteenth century had been obliterated by the Napoleonic conquests.

Their territory had to be redistributed in a manner compatible with a refound equilibrium. The conduct of diplomacy at the Congress of Vienna was fundamentally different from twenty-first-century practice. Contemporary diplomats are in immediate real- time contact with their capitals.

They receive minutely detailed instructions down to the texts of their presentations; their advice is sought on local conditions, much less frequently on matters of grand strategy. The diplomats at Vienna were weeks away from their capitals. It took four days for a message from Vienna to reach Berlin so at least eight days to receive a reply to any request for guidance , three weeks for a message to reach Paris; London took a little longer.

Instructions therefore had to be drafted in language general enough to cover changes in the situation, so the diplomats were instructed primarily on general concepts and long-term interests; with respect to day-to-day tactics, they were largely on their own.

And because one could never foresee which particular piece would be missing in any given instance, he was totally unpredictable. But they did not have congruent perceptions of what this would mean in practice. Their task was to achieve some reconciliation of perspectives shaped by substantially different historical experiences.

Britain, safe from invasion behind the English Channel and with unique domestic institutions essentially impervious to developments on the Continent, defined order in terms of threats of hegemony on the Continent. But the continental countries had a lower threshold for threats; their security could be impaired by territorial adjustments short of continental hegemony. Above all, unlike Britain, they felt vulnerable to domestic transformations in neighboring countries.

The Congress of Vienna found it relatively easy to agree on a definition of the overall balance. Already during the war—in —then British Prime Minister William Pitt had put forward a plan to rectify what he considered the weaknesses of the Westphalian settlement. The Westphalian treaties had kept Central Europe divided as a way to enhance French influence. The obvious candidate to absorb these abolished principalities was Prussia, which originally preferred to annex contiguous Saxony but yielded to the entreaties of Austria and Britain to accept the Rhineland instead.

This enlargement of Prussia placed a significant power on the border of France, creating a geostrategic reality that had not existed since the Peace of Westphalia. In that sense Germany has for much of history been either too weak or too strong for the peace of Europe. The German Confederation was too divided to take offensive action yet cohesive enough to resist foreign invasions into its territory. This arrangement provided an obstacle to the invasion of Central Europe without constituting a threat to the two major powers on its flanks, Russia to the east and France to the west.

To protect the new overall territorial settlement, the Quadruple Alliance of Britain, Prussia, Austria, and Russia was formed. A territorial guarantee—which was what the Quadruple Alliance amounted to—did not have the same significance for each of the signatories. The level of urgency with which threats were perceived varied significantly. Britain, protected by its command of the seas, felt confident in withholding definite commitments to contingencies and preferred waiting until a major threat from Europe took specific shape.

The continental countries had a narrower margin of safety, assessing that their survival might be at stake from actions far less dramatic than those causing Britain to take alarm. This was particularly the case in the face of revolution—that is, when the threat involved the issue of legitimacy.

The conservative states sought to build bulwarks against a new wave of revolution; they aimed to include mechanisms for the preservation of legitimate order—by which they meant monarchical rule. His partners saw in the Holy Alliance—subtly redesigned—a way to curb Russian exuberance.

The right of intervention was limited because, as the eventual terms stipulated, it could be exercised only in concert; in this manner, Austria and Prussia retained a veto over the more exalted schemes of the Czar. Three tiers of institutions buttressed the Vienna system: the Quadruple Alliance to defeat challenges to the territorial order; the Holy Alliance to overcome threats to domestic institutions; and a concert of powers institutionalized through periodic diplomatic conferences of the heads of government of the alliances to define their common purposes or to deal with emerging crises.

This concert mechanism functioned like a precursor of the United Nations Security Council. Its conferences acted on a series of crises, attempting to distill a common course: the revolutions in Naples in and in Spain in —23 quelled by the Holy Alliance and France, respectively and the Greek revolution and war of independence of —32 ultimately supported by Britain, France, and Russia. The Concert of Powers did not guarantee a unanimity of outlook, yet in each case a potentially explosive crisis was resolved without a major-power war.

For most of the eighteenth century, armies had marched across that then-province of the Netherlands, in quest of the domination of Europe. For Britain, whose global strategy was based on control of the oceans, the Scheldt River estuary, at the mouth of which lay the port of Antwerp across the channel from England, needed to be in the hands of a friendly country and under no circumstances of a major European state.

The new state agreed not to join military alliances or permit the stationing of foreign troops on its territory.

This pledge in turn was guaranteed by the major powers, which thereby undertook the obligation to resist violations of Belgian neutrality. The internationally guaranteed status lasted for nearly a century; it was the trigger that brought England into World War I, when German troops forced a passage to France through Belgian territory.

The vitality of an international order is reflected in the balance it strikes between legitimacy and power and the relative emphasis given to each.

Neither aspect is intended to arrest change; rather, in combination they seek to ensure that it occurs as a matter of evolution, not a raw contest of wills. If the balance between power and legitimacy is properly managed, actions will acquire a degree of spontaneity. Demonstrations of power will be peripheral and largely symbolic; because the configuration of forces will be generally understood, no side will feel the need to call forth its full reserves.

When that balance is destroyed, restraints disappear, and the field is open to the most expansive claims and the most implacable actors; chaos follows until a new system of order is established.

That balance was the signal achievement of the Congress of Vienna. The Quadruple Alliance deterred challenges to the territorial balance, and the memory of Napoleon kept France—suffering from revolutionary exhaustion—quiescent.

And Austria, Prussia, and Russia, which on the principles of the balance of power should have been rivals, were in fact pursuing common policies: Austria and Russia in effect postponed their looming geopolitical conflict in the name of their shared fears of domestic upheaval.

The historian Jacques Barzun has described it another way: Underlying the theory was fact: the revolutionary and Napoleonic armies had redrawn the mental map of Europe. In place of the eighteenth century horizontal world of dynasties and cosmopolite upper classes, the West now consisted of vertical unities—nations, not wholly separate but unlike.

Linguistic nationalisms made traditional empires—especially the Austro-Hungarian Empire—vulnerable to internal pressure as well as to the resentments of neighbors claiming national links with subjects of the empire.

The competition of the two great German powers in Central Europe for the allegiance of some thirty-five smaller states of the German Confederation was originally held in check by the need to defend Central Europe. Also, tradition generated a certain deference to the country whose ruler had been Holy Roman Emperor for half a millennium. The Assembly of the German Confederation the combined ambassadors to the confederation of its thirty-seven members met in the Austrian Embassy in Frankfurt, and the Austrian ambassador acted as chairman.

At the same time, Prussia was developing its own claim to eminence. With the passage of decades, the relative subordination of Prussian to Austrian policy became too chafing, and Prussia began to pursue a more confrontational course. The revolutions of were a Europe-wide conflagration affecting every major city. As a rising middle class sought to force recalcitrant governments to accept liberal reform, the old aristocratic order felt the power of accelerating nationalisms.

At first, the uprisings swept all before them, stretching from Poland in the east as far west as Colombia and Brazil an empire that had recently won its independence from Portugal, after serving as the seat of its exile government during the Napoleonic Wars. The Holy Alliance had been designed to deal precisely with upheavals such as these. For the rest, the old order proved just strong enough to overcome the revolutionary challenge.

But it never regained the self-confidence of the previous period. Finally, the Crimean War of —56 broke up the unity of the conservative states —Austria, Prussia, and Russia—which had been one of the two key pillars of the Vienna international order.

This combination had defended the existing institutions in revolutions; it had isolated France, the previous disturber of the peace. Now another Napoleon was probing for opportunities to assert himself in multiple directions. The alignment indeed checked the Russian advance, but at the cost of increasingly brittle diplomacy. The conflict had begun not over the Crimea—which Russia had conquered from an Ottoman vassal in the eighteenth century—but over competing French and Russian claims to advance the rights of favored Christian communities in Jerusalem, then within Ottoman jurisdiction.

The demand— which amounted to a right of intervention in the affairs of a foreign state—was couched in the terms of universal moral principles but cut to the heart of Ottoman sovereignty.

Ottoman refusal prompted a Russian military advance into the Balkans and naval hostilities in the Black Sea.

After six months Britain and France, fearing the collapse of the Ottoman Empire and with it the European balance, entered the war on the Ottoman side. The alliance systems of the Congress of Vienna were shattered as a consequence.

Prussia stayed neutral. The effort to isolate Russia concluded by isolating Austria. Within two years, Napoleon invaded the Austrian possessions in Italy in support of Italian unification while Russia stood by. Within Germany, Prussia gained freedom of maneuver. Within a decade Otto von Bismarck started Germany on the road to unification, excluding Austria from what had been its historical role as the standard-bearer of German statehood—again with Russian acquiescence.

Austria learned too late that in international affairs a reputation for reliability is a more important asset than demonstrations of tactical cleverness.

Both have been viewed as archetypal conservatives. Both have been recorded as master manipulators of the balance of power, which they were. He was born in the Rhineland, near the border of France, educated in Strasbourg and Mainz. Metternich did not see Austria until his thirteenth year and did not live there until his seventeenth. He was appointed Foreign Minister in and Chancellor in , serving until Fate had placed him in the top civilian position in an ancient empire at the beginning of its decline.

Once considered among the strongest and best-governed countries in Europe, Austria was now vulnerable because its central location meant that every European tremor made the earth move there.

Its polyglot nature made it vulnerable to the emerging wave of nationalism—a force practically unknown a generation earlier. For Metternich, steadiness and reliability became the lodestar of his policy: Where everything is tottering it is above all necessary that something, no matter what, remain steadfast so that the lost can find a connection and the strayed a refuge.

A product of the Enlightenment, Metternich was shaped more by philosophers of the power of reason than by the proponents of the power of arms.

Metternich rejected the restless search for presumed remedies to the immediate; he considered the search for truth the most important task of the statesman. In his view, the belief that whatever was imaginable was also achievable was an illusion. Truth had to reflect an underlying reality of human nature and of the structure of society. Anything more sweeping in fact did violence to the ideals it claimed to fulfill.

Bismarck, by comparison, was a scion of the provincial Prussian aristocracy, which was far poorer than its counterparts in the west of Germany and considerably less cosmopolitan. While Metternich tried to vindicate continuity and to restore a universal idea, that of a European society, Bismarck challenged all the established wisdom of his period.

Until he appeared on the scene, it had been taken for granted that German unity would come about—if at all—through a combination of nationalism and liberalism. To Metternich, order arose not so much from the pursuit of national interest as from the ability to connect it with that of other states: The great axioms of political science derive from the recognition of the true interests of all states; it is in the general interest that the guarantee of existence is to be found, while particular interests—the cultivation of which is considered political wisdom by restless and short-sighted men—have only a secondary importance.

Modern history demonstrates the application of the principle of solidarity and equilibrium … and of the united efforts of states … to force a return to the common law. Bismarck rejected the proposition that power could be restrained by superior principle.

Ultimate decisions would depend strictly on considerations of utility. The European order as seen in the eighteenth century, as a great Newtonian clockwork of interlocking parts, had been replaced by the Darwinian world of the survival of the fittest. With the conservative monarchies of the East divided in the aftermath of the Crimean War, France isolated on the Continent because of the memories evoked by its ruler, and Austria wavering between its national and its European roles, Bismarck saw an opportunity to bring about a German national state for the first time in history.

With a few daring strokes between and , he placed Prussia at the head of a united Germany and Germany in the center of a new system of order. What emerged after the unification of Germany was a dominant country, strong enough to defeat each neighbor individually and perhaps all the continental countries together.

The bond of legitimacy had disappeared. Everything now depended on calculations of power. TXT For Later. Related titles. Carousel Previous Carousel Next. Jump to Page. Search inside document.

Related Interests Nature. Evan Husada Sidrap. Drs Mulatua. Christian Eduard de Dios. Faeeza Bianca Quiamco. Fitria Hardiyanti. Oz Nugroho. Novia Ranti Unforgettable. Edmund Halley. The magazine covers everything Deere, including two cylinder, New Generation, combines and other Deere equipment. There are currently 27 free magazine subscriptions that you can claim. Subscribe to Adore Home Magazine's printed issues and receive 1 year 4 issues of the magazine delivered to your letterbox.

Subscribe now and save, give a gift subscription or get help with an existing subscription. The site also lets you manage which titles you receive. Latest stories. Most people receiving the magazines choose to keep the subscriptions. Izzy hugged her knees to her chest, her stomach a tight ball of humiliation.

A specific magazine might not always be available; you just have to catch what's out there! Cosmopolitan is sometimes available, but I don't know if it's giving out free subscriptions at the moment. Although we will do our utmost to ensure that your magazine is delivered at the same time it is available in the shops or sooner it is possible on some occasions it may be unavoidably delayed.

This page provides various useful Magazine Subscriptions to you, which are absolutely Free. Synapse Group, Inc. Daily Word, published by Unity, offers insight and inspiration to help people of all faiths live healthy, prosperous and meaningful lives. To get started, click the link below to visit mymagnow. A reader, Kristi, shared: The Hospital I used to volunteer at has a special drop box for magazines. Browse the latest offers, active discounts, and exclusive Magazine coupons designed to help get you the best possible prices on RewardBee offers great rewards in exchange for completing surveys!

Discover new products and services that meet your interests. Our services allow you to consolidate all of your subscription needs with one company. Subscribe to The New Yorker magazine and get the best rate, as well as offers for student and educators.

To receive a qualification form by mail please send your name, address, title, company name, and telephone number to Professional Pilot magazine, Shawnee Rd, suite , Alexandria VA Spectator Well written conservative British magazine. Chapin HydroFeed Fertilizer Injector. Free Subscription To Den of Geek Quarterly Magazine The Den of Geek quarterly magazine will be packed with exclusive features, interviews, previews, and deep dives into geek culture.

Science offers a combination of information that is free to everyone and information that is only available to subscribers. Whether you're a rookie or a seasoned vet, Wood magazine is your one-stop source for making all your woodworking projects a success! Every issue is packed with great shop-tested projects more than 50 a year! Start your subscription today!

Discover new workout ideas, healthy-eating recipes, makeup looks, skin-care advice, the best beauty products and tips, trends, and more from SELF.

Since then, we've been helping creative people make better video by providing the latest news in video trends, training and technology. If you have a passion for catalogs, then this is the destination for you.

Read our free issue. To begin or renew your magazine subscription, please select from the choices below: Entertainment Weekly brings you the latest TV, movie, music, and book news daily. Futures Magazine archives can be explored by clicking on image covers below. Just fill out a short survey to get in reward points to redeem on magazine subscriptions like Good Housekeeping, Parents, House Beautiful and more!!

With in rewards you'll be able to get a few different magazines completely free. All content is now available on digital channels and Futuresmag. Well focus on the hottest movies and TV shows, explore the latest in games, books, and comics while also bringing you retrospectives on your favorite classics.

The authority on retirement relocation since , Where to Retire magazine helps you research thousands of possibilities. How I find free magazine subscriptions. Each issue features the latest in the world of horror; from feature interviews, classic retrospectives, trivia, debates and more! Plus: the latest film, book, comic book, music, game, toy releases and much, much more! Some of these free gifts are worth more than the value of the magazine subscription.

About Slickdeals. The scientific team at CSP then overlaid this picture of the human footprint on nature in the lower 48 states and Washington, D. S Census Bureau demographic data, broken down into small geographic areas known as census tracts, which are about the size of a neighborhood in terms of population.

The data reveal substantial differences in the degree of nature deprivation faced by different racial, ethnic, income, and family structure groups. Figures 1 and 2 summarize some of these findings, but there are at least three trends that are particularly concerning:. Nature deprivation has consequences. Studies have found that, because they are more likely to live in polluted areas without sufficient tree cover and spaces to get outdoors, people of color and low-income communities are more susceptible to developing immunocompromising illnesses such as asthma—a risk factor for COVID In fact, scientists estimate that every dollar spent on creating and maintaining park trails can save almost three dollars in health care alone—a benefit that is being denied to the most economically distressed communities.

Natural spaces also act as climate regulators that mitigate urban heat islands—metropolitan areas that are warmer than their surrounding rural areas due to their surfaces and the human activities taking place—cooling the surrounding area by as much as 10 degrees Fahrenheit. Beyond national disparities in the distribution of nature across racial and economic groups, the data reveal concerning state-level disparities.

At the outset, it is worth noting that in all states but New Mexico and the District of Columbia, census tracts classified as white had the lowest nature deprivation of any racial and ethnic groups. In contrast, in 26 states, Black communities experienced the highest levels of nature deprivation. In 16 states, Asian communities experienced the most nature deprivation.

Hispanic and Latino people experienced the most nature deprivation out of all racial and ethnic groups in eight states. Natural area loss is particularly acute for Hispanic and Latino communities along the U. Evaluating state-level data by income shows that, in almost two-thirds of states, low-income residents were most likely to live in nature-deprived areas, while in 16 states, the highest income earners were the least likely to live in nature-deprived areas.

The analysis also identified so-called hotspot tracts, where there is both the highest proportion of people of color or low-income households and the highest proportion of nature deprivation.

The identification of these hotspots could also inform project-level decision-making such as analyzing how an oil lease sale or new trail would affect a socioeconomic nature deprivation hotspot. No age group needs nature more than children. Studies consistently find that children who spend time outdoors in natural environments experience improved health and cognitive functions, strong motor coordination, reduced stress, and enhanced social skills. The data from CSP, however, indicate that children in the United States have far less nature nearby than the overall population.

Specifically, census tracts in the contiguous 48 states and Washington, D. In every single state, with the exception of Louisiana, families and individuals with young children were more nature deprived than families and individuals without young children. For low-income families with children and families of color with children, the disparities in nature access are even more acute. Black and Latino or Hispanic families with children were the most nature deprived of any race or ethnicity examined.

An oil and gas boom in the United States over the past two decades has fueled a rapid expansion in a network of pipelines, well pads, roads, and other infrastructure that is fragmenting natural areas and wildlife habitat.

This energy boom has pushed fossil fuel infrastructure closer and closer to schools and neighborhoods, contributing to greater air and water pollution, spills and industrial accidents, and the loss of nearby nature. The data generated by CSP confirm that, along with urban sprawl, energy development is a top driver of natural area loss in the United States, causing the loss of at least 6 million acres of natural area from to In certain regions of the country, this explosion of energy infrastructure has had a disproportionate impact on nature access for some nonwhite and low-income communities.

For example, in the parts of Appalachia where coal mining has been most concentrated—including Kentucky, West Virginia, and southwestern Virginia—low-income communities are located in areas with higher-than-average levels of nature loss due to energy development. In Colorado, meanwhile, Hispanic and Latino communities have more energy development nearby than any other racial or ethnic group. Native Americans, in particular, are experiencing disproportionate impacts of oil, gas, and coal development on land, water, and wildlife.

In 22 states, Native American communities are in places with the most or second-most energy development out of all racial and ethnic groups. As shown in Figure 7, on the Navajo Nation and parts of the Ute Mountain Reservation in the Southwest, for example, Native American populations experience above-average natural area loss from oil and gas development on nearby public lands. Energy development on public lands that threatens sacred sites, depletes natural resources, or pollutes the environment is especially egregious because it often stems from the U.

The Trump administration has exacerbated this failing, exhibiting a pattern of ignoring tribal input or conducting insufficient government-to-government consultations. In New Mexico, for example, the administration has ignored tribal input in proposing to expand oil and gas development near Chaco Canyon, the ancestral homeland of Pueblo tribes and of cultural significance to the Navajo Nation.

The treatment of tribal consultation as a formality or an afterthought that can be circumvented is a core contributing factor to the loss of nature near tribes due to energy development. In order to address the nature deficit, tribes must not be excluded from the design and conceptualization stage of plans to manage natural resources, and extractive activities must not be prioritized over tribal sovereignty.

Providing equitable access to nature, reducing the disproportionate impact of pollution on communities of color and economically disadvantaged communities, and addressing the legacies of racism and injustice in natural resource policy must be core priorities in any effort to better conserve nature in America.

While this report focuses primarily on racial and economic inequities that are readily apparent through census tracts, it must be noted that public lands and nature can also be unwelcoming and exclusionary spaces for many deliberately overlooked populations, including LGBTQ communities and disabled people.